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(CCDR) achieve our nation's strategic priorities. They develop plans to engage their regional areas, ranging from peacetime security cooperation activities to full combat to post-reconstruction activities. A critical component of the theater security process involves shaping the regional environment by conducting peacetime engagement activities. As a force provider to the CCDRs, the Army Reserve Components (RC) participate in many exercises and humanitarian operations. Through the formal Program Objective Memorandum process, the services request funds to support the CCDRs theater engagement activities. Although the Active Army is successfully acquiring Operational and Maintenance funds to support these activities, the RCs are underfunded. However, a revision of the Program, Planning, Budget, Execution (PPBE) process will enable the Army RCs to receive adequate funding to assure their continued support of the CCDRs theater engagement activities. This SRP recommends several solutions to this problem as a means of enabling the Army RCs' support to the CCDRs theater security cooperation activities.
ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT IN THEATER ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
Through a systematic process mandated by law, our nation's leaders develop and promulgate national strategic security guidance which is set forth in The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Together, these three strategic documents provide the framework for the planning and execution of the regional Combatant Commanders' (CCDRs) theater engagement strategy. The CCDRs develop plans and strategies to engage their regional partners in order to accomplish U.S. objectives. These activities range from peacetime engagement, to conflict and post-conflict nation-rebuilding.
The CCDRs employ the capabilities of Army Reserve Component (both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve) units as a means of executing many of their peacetime engagement activities. In order to accomplish these engagement activities, the CCDRs, through the services, submit budget requirements as part of each service's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). These budget submissions identify the total incremental costs associated with the CCDRs engagement priorities. While the services have historically received adequate Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to accomplish these engagement activities, Army RCs' have not received adequate pay and allowance (P&A) funds to support their participation in these activities. This P&A shortage is caused in part by the separation of appropriations within the POM process.
However, some alteration of the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) process can correct this deficiency and better enable the RCs' support to the CCDRs.
The Strategic Framework
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, established the framework for our current process of formulating the nation's strategic guidance. At the request of the Truman administration, Congress passed this act to end the internal turf-battles that complicated the security policy process at the time. 1 The 1947 NSA established the office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as a cabinet level position to preside over the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy. 2 Additionally, the 1947 NSA established the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and most importantly the National Security Council (NSC). 3 In 1949, the Act was amended to further expand the powers of the SECDEF. Prior to this amendment, the SECDEF had only limited ability to orchestrate defense policy. Indeed, the ability of the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, to execute policy was so perplexing that the process drove him from office.
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By statute, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, SECDEF, Secretary of State, and other advisers as required. 5 The President, with the aid of other members of the NSC, develops the nation's strategic policies. Currently, this guidance is summarized in the National Security Strategy (NSS). This powerful document is a product of:
The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action.
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Sometimes referred to as the nation's grand strategy, the NSS provides a longterm view of our nation's priorities. Grand strategy represents "a country's broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system." 7 Grand strategy thus coordinates "all the resources of a nation…towards the attainment of the political object." 8 The NSS guidance shapes the nation's affairs by establishing policy priorities for foreign aid, budgets, intelligence matters, and defense priorities. Additionally, as part of the overall JSPP, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
"provides the means to evaluate risks and threats in order to assess the adequacy of current strategy. The JSPS proposes military strategy, forces, and capabilities necessary to achieve our national security objectives in a resource-limited environment." 17 As a means to provide the CCDRs guidance establishing requirements and apportioning resources focused on near-term capabilities, the CJCS provides the CCDRs the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). 18 So, the NMS provides the overall security and policy guidance from the CJCS and in turn outlines the "strategic direction for the development of the JSCP." 19 Whereas the NMS focuses on overall objectives required to execute the NSS, the JSCP provides the CCDRs with focused military strategic and operational guidance.
This guidance is incorporated into the preparation of campaign plans, operational plans (OPLANS), and security cooperation plans. Moreover, "the JSCP is the link between strategic guidance and the joint operation planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance." 20 The JSCP also provides the CCDRs with regional objectives and designates tasks that achieve these objectives. The JSCP thus implements the guidance in the NMS through execution of CCDRs operational and engagement plans. 21 The range of operations included in the JSCP includes peacetime security cooperation activities through strategic nuclear response. The overall role of the JSCP is "to provide CCDR and Service planners with meaningful, necessary guidance balanced between the details needed to conduct coordinated, sustainable peacetime activities and specific contingencies while still allowing commanders flexibility to respond to unanticipated events." 22 The Combatant Commanders
The CCDRs serve as the executors of our nation's strategic plans. The 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) directs an operational chain of command that runs from the President to the Sectary of Defense to the CCDRs. 23 Additionally, the GNA designates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide guidance to the CCDRs who are responsible for:
Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense. Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans. Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans. Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command. 24 In addition to guidance provided in the JSCP, the CCDRs are assigned tasks, geographical boundaries, and overall authority from the President in the Unified
Command Plan (UCP). 25 The President uses the UCP to specify "high level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis…[and provide] structure and organizational philosophies" 26 for the CCDRs. CCDRs then develop and plan strategies that integrate "national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means)" 27 into activities that support the overall national objectives in their region.
Theater Engagement Strategy Development
One of the concepts specified in the strategic planning guidance is the CCDRs requirement to engage in military activities abroad. These activities are a means to shape the global environment to meet our political objectives as well as support a mutually favorable antiterrorism climate abroad. This strategy is designed to prevent conflict and surprise attacks by deterring terrorist aggression. CCDRs accomplish these objectives by using intelligence resources and rotationally deployed military personnel to support their regional objectives and security cooperation activities.
The CCDRs integrate this guidance into their overall theater strategy, which specifies "concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power." 28 Theater strategy thus covers a broad spectrum of activities ranging from "peacetime cooperation with other countries, to meeting potential threats through contingency planning…and crisis action planning." 29 In summary;
Theater strategy is an extension of national military strategy tailored to a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR). It is both similar and in complementary support to national strategy. A combatant commander's theater strategy consists of the three elements found in any strategy: theater objectives and strategic end states (ends), which are achieved through the synchronization of integrated strategic concepts (ways), by using theater organization, activities, and plans employing joint, interagency, and multinational resources (means), and thereby accomplishes national and multinational objectives.
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CCDRs then develop operational and security cooperation plans that propose a full range of operations to "engage other countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S. and friendly nation interests." 31 These operations are categorized as operational phases 0 through 5.
Within the phasing model, activities conducted in phases 0 and 1 are identified in the CCDRs peacetime Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) while phases 2 through 5 are outlined in the JSCP directed operation plans. 32 The TSCP identifies security cooperation activities and interagency resources required to interact successfully with the region's nations. The CCDR's TSCP consists of five elements: a CCDRs strategic assessment, a concept for implementing security cooperation priorities, measures of effectiveness, risk assessment, and resource requirements. 33 These activities "support national goals at the regional level, and enhance military operations by obviating the need for military action, or by preparing the environment for U.S. military intervention, should it be necessary." 34 These plans support interagency efforts by synchronizing "the broader diplomatic, economic, and information activities established by…referencing the NSS and the Department of States' Strategic Plan." 35 Phase 0 operations address the CCDRs overall theater shaping activities. These peacetime activities are performed to "dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies…and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives." 36 Thereby, the CCDRs achieve peacetime strategy objectives by developing engagement activities intended to "shape the theater security environment in peacetime." The Theatre Engagement Environment Thus, the information provided in the UCP and the other strategic guidance documents outlines the CCDRs overall missions and responsibilities. 41 Conforming to this guidance, the CCDRs provide strategic direction to their subordinate service commands. Additionally, this guidance provides the impetus for the planning and conduct of unified operations. It also focuses on unified operations that engage the interagency operations within the theater.
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This analysis finally addresses the capability of Army RC forces to serve as a force provider to the CCDRs theater engagement shaping activities. Specifically, it focuses on Army RC's contributions to the activities conducted within the CCDRs TSCP or potential phase 0 operations. These phase 0 operations, designated as shaping activities, focus on engagement actives that promote U.S. strategic interests in the region. These activities allow the CCDR to "shape the security environment to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional objectives." 43 These activities may focus on deterrence activities which make a potential aggressor reluctant to act. Typically, they also present a forward U.S. presence which demonstrates our commitment and lends credibility to alliances in order to enhance regional stability and, in crisis response, provides the CCDR options to gain quick control of unanticipated and destabilizing situations.
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Although these shaping activities may involve elements of combat operations, these activities are mostly non-combative. Moreover, these security cooperation efforts focus on peacetime activities that enable the CCDR to influence or shape the international environment in accord with U.S. interests. 45 The overall objectives of these peacetime activities are to: Build defense relationships that promote specified U.S. security interests, build allied and friendly military capabilities to conduct self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access as well as en route infrastructure. At the height of their overseas engagement activities in 2002, the Army National Guard deployed 27,385 soldiers into 64 countries in support of CCDR engagement activities, 54 including the CJCS exercises. These exercises provide two operational benefits. First, the program contributes greatly to joint, multinational, and combined training. They also provide a unique gateway to strategic access within the CCDRs AORs. Thus, the CJCS program "provides significant political and diplomatic returns.
Exercises demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability to project military power anywhere in the world in support of U.S. national interests and commitments to our allies." Resourcing: Boots on the Ground By law, the CCDRs carry out the missions assigned to them within their geographic area by employing assigned and allocated forces. 68 These missions are part of the CCDRs overall theater strategy. The CCDRs identify their required resources to accomplish these missions. These requirements are prioritized, by order of importance in their Integrated Priority List (IPL).
The CCDRs prepare an Integrated Priority List (IPL), which is a succinct statement of key capability gaps that could hinder the performance of assigned missions. This list is prioritized across Service and functional lines and is fiscally constrained. The IPL is submitted to the SecDef, DepSecDef, and the Chairman. The Joint Staff highlights CCDR concerns…to provide analysis, assessments, and recommendations. The highest priority CCDR shortfalls…are reviewed by the 3-Star Programmers.
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The CCDRs identify the resource requirements in their IPLs, which are then integrated into the PPBE process on two levels as part of the programming phase of PPBE. First, CCDRs influence the service budget by integrating their requirements into the subordinate service Major Command's (MACOMs) POM submission. 70 The services are required to indicate their ability to resource the CCDRs IPL submission as part of their POM submissions. If they are unable to support the IPL request internally, they must provide justification for this short fall. After reviewing the services' POM submissions, the CCDRs may appeal by reclama if they determine their requirement was not adequately supported. These decisions, outlined in the SECDEF's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), reflect the final approved changes to the POM submissions. 71 The Resource Dilemma
As we have learned, expenditures of public funds are dependent upon
Congressional authorizations. That is, Congress must first authorize governmental programs and then appropriate the funds to execute the programs. Funds authorized by
Congress that enable the CCDRs to accomplish their theater engagement strategy come in a number of appropriations. Generally, the most common funds used to pay for these activities come in the Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) appropriation.
OMA appropriations enable commanders to pay for a wide range of products and services and to support all of their operations. They are typically one of the largest appropriations a military service receives:
[OMA] appropriation includes operation and maintenance of all Army, organizational equipment and facilities; purchasing equipment and supplies; production of audiovisual instructional materials and training aids; operation of service-wide and establishment-wide activities; operation of depots, schools, training (including cost of training civilian employees in the program from which the salaries are payable), recruiting, and programs related to OMA; welfare and morale, information, education, and religious activities; and expenses of courts, boards, and commissions This appropriation is generally an annual appropriation, available for obligation for one fiscal year only. The result of this inequity in funding is that without the associated RC incremental P&A training funds, the OMA funds have limited utility. Moreover, the requirements used to justify funding levels of these engagement activities are codependent. That is, OMA funds are used primarily to support the personnel on the ground participating in the engagement activity. Therefore, if the quantity of personnel on the ground participating in the engagement activity is less than required due to reduced P&A funding, the matching OMA funds are at risk of improper uses.
Consider the following explanations for this shortfall: First, the Deputy Sectary of Defense approved a plan to reduce the Army's overall 2006 funding by $2.4 billion in Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753. 80 While guidance outlined in PBD 753 budget reductions was vague, it advised the Army to "spread the reduction to any program and appropriation as a means to achieve efficiencies… [and] go after non-core missions." 81 The failure of this mandate is that it did not provide program managers specific instructions to identify funding reductions.
Secondly, the Army has not acknowledged the value of these theater engagement activities. In addition, the results of the engagement activity are not adequately linked to measures of effectiveness in the POM. Whereas strategic planners go to great lengths to identify measures of effectiveness for engagement activities as part of the Army
International Activities Plan, they fail to adequately integrate this data into the PPBS process. While CCDR staff planners track engagement activity achievements using a number of database systems, they collectively fail to capture all activities that are not electronically linked to the PPBE process. 83 These data base exchanges must link to the MDEP cost fields in the DAQS automation system.
Secondly, planners and resource managers must develop specific MDEPs that are unique to each CCDR and that stand alone from other training MDEPs. These standalone MDEPs will enable resource managers to capture all associated costs of these activities within each CCDRs AOR.
Finally, the result of the incremental RC P&A requirements must move from the TRST MDEP to those associated with the CCDRs unique activity MDEPs. This will enable planners to adequately capture and link the full spectrum of costs across all appropriations for each CCDR engagement activity within a single MDEP. Then, the TT peg alone will validate the consolidated OMA and RC P&A requirements in support of the CCDRs IPL submissions.
Conclusion
A systematic process authorized by law provides the framework for our nation's strategic security environment. Three primary documents, the NSS, the NMS, and the NDS, along with supporting documents provide strategic guidance to our nation's military leaders. Charged with oversight of a geographical region of the world, the CCDRs develop plans and activities to interact with other U.S. government agencies and foreign nations within their regions in order to achieve the nation's strategic objectives. As they develop their ways of accomplishing these ends, the CCDRs develop plans and activities for a variety of engagements, ranging from peacetime cooperation to post-conflict to nation-rebuilding efforts. As a means of accomplishing peacetime activities designed to shape their regional strategic area in our interest, the CCDRs execute security cooperation activities. These activities focus on a wide range of events, from military contacts and training programs to humanitarian assistance activities and partnership for peace programs. To support the CCDRs, Army RC personnel participate in these activities as rotational and forward deployed forces.
In addition to developing engagement plans and activities, CCDR and service MACOM staffs identify incremental funding requirements to resource these programs.
The costs associated with these activities generally come from OMA funding for Army active component event sponsors and P&A training funds for Army RC components. MDEPs will then reflect the total incremental costs across all Army appropriations.
Finally, Active and RC Army agencies must present a combined requirement in each of the CCDRs MDEPs in order to present the total OMA and P&A incremental costs associated with each peacetime engagement activity.
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